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I. Introduction
A male prison guard repeatedly rapes a female prisoner for
close to a year. 1 A prison supervisor learns of the ongoing abuse
after the prisoner files a grievance and he launches an
investigation into the assault. 2 Multiple prisoners and guards
verify that the abuse occurred. 3 Nevertheless, the supervisor
permits the accused guard to continue working during the
investigation. 4 As an offhand gesture, the supervisor transfers the
victim out of the cellblock where her attacker works. 5 However, to
the victim’s dismay, the supervisor reassigns her to her attacker’s
cellblock mere weeks later. 6 With the supervisor placing the
prisoner back within her attacker’s reach, the guard continues to
assault the prisoner. 7 Should the supervisor be liable for the rape
1. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 5, Qasem v. Toro, 737 F. Supp. 2d 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-CV-8361), ECF No. 1 (explaining that the attacker
worked in Building 93, which is where the victim lived).
2. See id. at 7 (mentioning that prisoners reported the assault to the
prison’s inspector general).
3. See id. (“[S]ome inmates and/or some corrections staff who suspected or
were aware of impermissible sexual activity between [the attacker] and [the
victim] reported it.”).
4. See id. at 11 (alleging that the supervisor was aware of the ongoing
investigation into the attacker’s misconduct).
5. See id. at 7 (explaining that the purpose of the transfer was to separate
the victim from her attacker).
6. See id. at 11 (complaining that the supervisor “caused or permitted [the
victim] to be repeatedly transferred into the housing area where [the attacker]
worked, allowing [the attacker] access to [the victim] to continue his abuse”).
7. See id. at 8 (alleging that the supervisor was “deliberately indifferent to
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that occurred once he transferred the victim back to her attacker’s
cellblock?
Fortunately, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides this victim a civil cause
of action to recover damages against any government official who
violates her constitutional rights. 8 The statute imposes (1) direct
liability on those who personally commit a constitutional tort and
(2) supervisory liability on those managing officials who direct or
permit their subordinates to commit an unconstitutional act. 9 In
theory, the victim above would be able to recover against both the
guard for raping her and the supervisor for enabling the guard to
continue raping her. 10 In practice, however, various legislative and
judicial hurdles prevent prisoners from recovering against their
abusers. 11
This Note analyzes two intra-Second Circuit splits that make
it nearly impossible for prisoners to recover against supervisors
under § 1983. 12 First, district courts in the Second Circuit are
divided as to whether the five categories of personal involvement
defined in Colon v. Coughlin 13 survive the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 14 Personal involvement by the
the unreasonable risk of further sexual assault of [the victim] by [the attacker]
and caused and/or permitted [the attacker] to have renewed access to [the victim]
on multiple occasions”).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (providing a remedy to victims of
constitutional violations committed by any person acting “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State”).
9. See William N. Evans, Supervisory Liability in the Fallout of Iqbal, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 103, 110–11 (2014) (distinguishing between the situation in
which an individual personally causes an injury and the situation in which an
individual causes an injury through the acts of another).
10. See id. at 111–13 (“For a plaintiff to prevail on a constitutional tort claim
using a theory of direct liability, she must show that she suffered a constitutional
injury at the hands of the defendant.”).
11. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018) (requiring a
prisoner to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal
court); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 63
(2018) (commenting that the doctrine of qualified immunity “is a judicially
invented immunity” and makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on a
§ 1983 claim).
12. See infra Parts III, IV (discussing the splits over (1) whether the test for
personal involvement defined in Colon survives Iqbal; and (2) whether a
supervisor is personally involved when they deny a prisoner’s grievance).
13. 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995).
14. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See infra Part III.C (explaining that some courts
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supervisory defendant is a necessary element to impose
supervisory liability. 15 Some district courts hold that only the first
and third Colon factors survive Iqbal, 16 while others hold that all
five factors still apply. 17
Second, district courts in the Second Circuit are divided as to
whether a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional tort
when he or she rejects a prisoner’s grievance complaining of the
misconduct. 18 Some district courts always find personal
involvement when a supervisor denies a grievance without
considering any other factors. 19 Other district courts only find
personal involvement when a supervisor investigates the alleged
misconduct or answers the grievance with a detailed response. 20
The Second Circuit must resolve both intra-circuit splits to
give full effect to § 1983 because the disagreement allows district
courts to dismiss claims on qualified immunity grounds. 21
Government officials are immune from suit and “entitled to
qualified immunity” if their actions “did not violate clearly
established law.” 22 District courts point to both of the intra-circuit
splits as evidence that the law surrounding supervisory liability is
not clearly established and therefore grant supervisory defendants
qualified immunity. 23
hold that Iqbal abrogates the Colon factors, while other courts limit Iqbal’s
holding to similar facts).
15. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled
in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (quoting
Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991))).
16. See infra Part III.C.1 (describing the restrictive courts).
17. See infra Part III.C.2 (describing the hybrid courts).
18. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that some district courts always find
personal involvement when a supervisor rejects a grievance, while other courts
look for some further action by the defendant).
19. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the simplistic approach).
20. See infra Parts IV.A.2–4 (discussing the investigation approach, detailed
response approach, and ongoing violation approach).
21. See infra Parts II.C, IV.B (explaining that supervisory defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity when they do not violate clearly established law
and both intra-circuit splits indicate that the law is not clearly established).
22. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).
23. See Hayes v. Santiago, No. 3:18-cv-01758, 2018 WL 5456494, at *3 (D.
Conn. Oct. 29, 2018) (explaining that the “Second Circuit law is not clearly
established” regarding whether a supervisor is personally involved when they
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The confusion surrounding supervisory liability in the Second
Circuit perfectly encapsulates how legislatures and courts have
quietly dismantled § 1983 as a viable cause of action for prisoners
in recent years. 24 Congress passed § 1983 with bold aspirations to
punish oppressive government actors who abuse their power by
infringing on individuals’ constitutional rights. 25 Given how
vulnerable prisoners are by virtue of their incarceration, § 1983
serves as one of the only practical tools they have to put them on
equal footing with their government custodians. 26 As the law
currently stands in the Second Circuit, this tool is broken.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 allows “private parties to enforce their federal
constitutional rights . . . against defendants who acted under color
of state law.” 27 The statute states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
deny a grievance); Ojo v. United States, No. 15-cv-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“Ultimately, however, I need not resolve the question
of whether Iqbal abrogated Colon . . . . because[] regardless of whether Colon’s
second category of supervisory liability survived Iqbal in such cases, the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the very uncertainty of
the governing law.”).
24. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 913–14 (2015) (“There is a growing
consensus among practitioners, scholars, and judges that Section 1983 is no
longer serving its original and intended function as a vehicle for remedying
violations of constitutional rights, that it is broken in many ways, and that it is
sorely in need of repairs.”).
25. See infra Part II.A (explaining how Congress passed the statute in 1871
to provide a civil remedy against government officials in the former Confederate
states who deprived African Americans of their newfound civil liberties).
26. See Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What to Do About It,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (demonstrating that “Section 1983 is a critically
important statute”).
27. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d
ed. 2014).
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liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 28

Section 1983 does not create any new individual substantive
rights, but simply provides a remedy when a government official,
acting in his or her official capacity, violates an existing
substantive right. 29
There are two essential elements of a § 1983 claim: (1) the
plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory
right; 30 and (2) the person depriving the plaintiff of such right must
have acted under the color of state law. 31 A defendant acts under
the color of state law when he or she “exercise[] power ‘possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” 32 This places
purely private action, absent relevant state authority, outside of
the scope of the statute. 33 A police officer, for instance, acts under
the color of state law when she performs her official job duties as
authorized by state law. 34

28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
29. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (explaining that
§ 1983 “merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere”); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676,
681 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that for plaintiffs, “§ 1983 serves as a vehicle to
obtain damages for violations of both the Constitution and of federal statutes”).
30. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 29–74 (explaining that plaintiffs often
allege constitutional violations of substantive and procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eight Amendment, and the prohibition against
unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment).
31. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (outlining the requirements to
bring a § 1983 claim); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 12 (expounding on the
two general elements and arguing that there are in fact four distinct elements to
§ 1983 claims: “(1) conduct by a ‘person’; (2) who acted ‘under color of state law’;
(3) proximately causing; (4) a deprivation of a federally protected right”).
32. West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941)).
33. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (clarifying
that “the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach
‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’” (quoting
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982))).
34. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 81 (providing examples of when a
government official acts under the color of state law).
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A. Historical Background of § 1983
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally called the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, to combat the Ku Klux Klan’s reign of terror in
the South. 35 By providing a civil right of action against government
officials who violate an individual’s constitutional rights, Congress
hoped to punish state officials who systematically denied African
Americans their civil liberties. 36 In fact, one of the chief goals of
the legislation was to afford a federal remedy, complementary to
state remedies, because “by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced . . . .” 37
Congress feared that the former Confederate states would not
respect the new progressive racial policies in the wake of the Civil
War. 38
Although Congress passed the statute in 1871, victims of
constitutional violations used § 1983 sparingly until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape 39 in 1961. 40 James Monroe
brought a § 1983 suit against the City of Chicago and several police
officers for breaking into his home without a warrant. 41 The
35. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (discussing how the Ku
Klux Klan deprived African Americans of their civil liberties and political rights
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1
(explaining that what is now § 1983 was originally passed as the Ku Klux Klan
Act).
36. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276 (discussing how state and local authorities
in the South encouraged individuals to prevent African Americans from
exercising their right to vote).
37. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
38. See id. at 183 (explaining that Congress passed § 1983 “because of the
conditions that existed in the South at that time”); Brad Reid, A Legal Overview
of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2017, 11:12
AM), https://perma.cc/KF7X-K5UA (last updated Apr. 14, 2017) (last visited Nov.
20, 2019) (explaining that § 1983 “was part of post Civil War legal developments
that include the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
40. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1 (explaining that § 1983 “did not
emerge as a tool for checking abuses by state officials until 1961, when the
Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape”); Monroe v. Pape, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/NV8W-AT5L (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (“Between 1871 and
1920, there were only 21 cases decided based on the statute, but in 1995 there
were more than 57,000.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169 (alleging that “13 Chicago police officers
broke into petitioners’ home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made
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defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
they did not act “under color of” state law in unlawfully searching
the plaintiffs’ home. 42
One of the essential elements of § 1983 is that the defendant
government official must act under the color of state law. 43 Prior
to Monroe, courts held that a government official did not act under
the color of state law if his or her actions also violated state law. 44
This rule permitted courts to dismiss § 1983 claims in virtually
every case because unconstitutional acts (which § 1983 seeks to
eliminate) are inherently illegal under state law. 45
For example, imagine that a prison guard violates a prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by viciously beating the prisoner without justification
or excuse. 46 Because the prison guard’s actions are illegal under
state law, pre-Monroe courts would find that the guard did not act
under the color of state law, and the requirements to bring a § 1983
claim would not be met. 47 This contradiction meant that victims
who suffered abuse at the hands of government officials could
never recover under § 1983 because constitutional violations are
inherently illegal. 48
them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying
drawers and ripping mattress covers”).
42. See id. at 172 (“It is argued that ‘under color of’ enumerated state
authority excluded acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority
under state law, state custom, or state usage to do what he did.”).
43. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 49–50 (explaining that “the
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’” (citation omitted)).
44. See Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1959), rev’d, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) (finding that the police officers did not act under the color of state law
because they infringed on the plaintiff’s due process rights in violation of state
law).
45. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–73 (demonstrating that the police violated
state law and the Constitution by breaking and entering into the plaintiff’s
apartment).
46. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding that “the use of
excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury”).
47. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (explaining that courts
were able to dismiss most § 1983 claims because it was nearly impossible to
satisfy the “color-of-state law” requirement).
48. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 (explaining that a police officer “violate[s]
the Constitution and laws of Illinois” by searching a home without a warrant).
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The Supreme Court reversed this rule in Monroe and held that
“actions taken by state government officials in carrying out their
responsibilities, even if contrary to state law, were nevertheless
actions taken ‘under color of law.’” 49 This holding gave full effect to
§ 1983 and finally made it a viable cause of action. 50
B. The Purpose of § 1983
The primary purpose of § 1983 “is to ensure that individuals
whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may
recover damages or secure injunctive relief.” 51 Congress had three
goals in mind when passing § 1983: (1) to supersede state laws
promoting discriminatory and unconstitutional activity; (2) to
“provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate”; and (3) “to
provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate
in theory, was not available in practice.” 52
In furtherance of this objective, the courts must liberally
construe § 1983 to give effect to the statute’s broad scope. 53
Congress did not limit enforcement of § 1983 to certain

49. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 2; see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (explaining
that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the phrase “under color of’
enumerated state authority excludes [from § 1983] acts of an official or policeman
who can show no authority under state law, state custom, or state usage to do
what he did”); DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.01 (2019)
(“The Court held that public officials’ actions meet the ‘color of law’ requirement
when they act under the authority of state law, regardless of whether their act is
illegal under state law.”).
50. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 4 (explaining that the Monroe decision
“revived the statute and turned it into an effective means of vindicating violations
of constitutional rights”).
51. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 n.5 (1989) (quoting Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984)).
52. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961) (describing the main
objectives of § 1983); SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1 (providing background
information and legislative history of § 1983).
53. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443–46 (1991) (emphasizing that
the legislative history of § 1983 supports a liberal construction of the statute);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989)
(explaining that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that coverage of [§ 1983]
must be broadly construed”); Hardin, 490 U.S. at 539 n.5 (reiterating that § 1983
must “be accorded ‘a sweep as broad as its language’” (citation omitted)).
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enumerated rights, but rather provided sweeping protection
against violations of any constitutional or statutory right. 54
Section 1983 serves an important role in enforcing the
Constitution and courts consider two core principles when
analyzing a prisoner’s claim of constitutional violations. 55 The first
principle is “that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid
constitutional claims of prison inmates.” 56 Although a prisoner’s
rights are restricted by the nature of his criminal confinement, “a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when
he is imprisoned for crime.” 57 Members of the public sometimes
argue that prisoners and criminals should lose their constitutional
rights solely based on their offender status. 58 A popular cliché
cautions “don’t do the crime if you can’t do the time.” 59 However,
“there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.” 60 The Supreme Court expressly rejects the
argument that prisoners are completely devoid of constitutional
protection. 61

54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (stating broadly that the statute applies to
“the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” (emphasis added)).
55. See Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 369, 373 (2012) (listing the
two core principles of prisoner constitutional claims).
56. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
57. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
58. See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY xi (2001) (discussing how the general public is
often “either indifferent or hostile to the concept of prisoners’ rights”); but see
James Welch, Why Do Human Rights Apply to Convicted Criminals?, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 14, 2009, 8:33 AM), https://perma.cc/A8TY-B7AZ (last visited Nov. 20,
2019) (dispelling and countering the opinion that prisoners should lose their
human rights) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See FLITER, supra note 58, at xi (discussing how some of the author’s
students do not “understand why the Constitution should even protect prison
inmates”).
60. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
61. See id. at 555 (rejecting an argument that prisoners are not afforded Due
Process as “plainly untenable”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485–86 (1969) (holding that prisoners have a
fundamental right to petition the government for redress and that the right of
habeas corpus cannot be obstructed).
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The second principle is that the actions of prison
administrators are entitled to judicial deference because they
require discretion to effectively run the prison. 62 Three
considerations guide this second principle: (1) American prisons
are extremely complex and their issues “are not readily susceptible
of resolution by [judicial] decree”; (2) operating and managing a
prison “is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources”; and (3)
prison operations “are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches . . . . and separation of powers
concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.” 63 These two
principles often conflict and courts must balance protecting
prisoners’ rights with enforcing the prison’s security needs. 64
C. Qualified Immunity: The Ultimate Defense
Even where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s constitutional
right, the defendant may still prevail by asserting a qualified
immunity defense. 65 Qualified immunity immunizes a government
official not only from liability, but from the lawsuit itself, “so long
as the official did not violate clearly established federal law.” 66 This
62. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (explaining that when the state penal system
is involved in allegations of constitutional abuse, federal courts “accord deference
to the appropriate prison authorities” in their decisions); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (explaining why prison administrators’ decisions are
entitled to judicial deference); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 559 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of judicial restraint when reviewing
prison officials’ actions and decisions).
63. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85.
64. See Shults, supra note 55, at 373 (explaining that “judges must decide
how to balance protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights with prison
administrators’ flexibility to achieve their goals”); Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406
(explaining that there is “tension between the traditional policy of judicial
restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional
rights”).
65. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (granting a defendant
qualified immunity when the law is not clearly established because “an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal development, nor
could he fairly to be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct”).
66. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 143; see Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
771–72 (2014) (clarifying that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009))); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (mentioning
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means that government actors “are not liable for bad guesses in
gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” 67 A
defendant is only liable under § 1983 where he or she violates
clearly established law. 68 On its face, qualified immunity is a
reasonable, prudent doctrine that promotes judicial efficiency.
However, as will be discussed later in this Note, courts are
increasingly using qualified immunity as a crutch to avoid ruling
on the two intra-circuit splits. 69
D. The Prison Grievance System
Until the 1960s, courts systematically refused to hear prisoner
complaints alleging constitutional violations under the “hands-off
doctrine.” 70 Under this theory, “federal courts refused to intervene
on the ground that ‘it is not the function of the courts to
superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in
penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who
are illegally confined.’” 71
Fortunately, the civil rights era of the 1960s sparked concern
over prison conditions, and courts responded 72 by reorganizing
that qualified immunity protects government officials from needless litigation
and allows them to focus on their official job duties).
67. Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
68. See City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 136 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015)
(explaining that qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011))).
69. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing how district courts in the Second
Circuit dismiss § 1983 suits on qualified immunity grounds to avoid resolving the
Colon split).
70. See Van Swearingen, Comment, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of
Negotiated Governance in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1353, 1355 (2008) (explaining that “[d]uring the vast majority of the United
States’ history, courts strictly adhered to a ‘hands-off’ approach toward prison
litigation”); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 594 (1984) (describing how during
this period, the “prevailing barbarism and squalor of many prisons were met with
a judicial blind eye”).
71. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 10–11 (4th ed., vol. 1 2009)
(quoting Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1951)).
72. See Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming the
district court’s intervention into the administration of a prison by ordering it to
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prisons into bureaucratic systems. 73 As part of the new
bureaucracy, prisons implemented internal grievance procedures
to avoid litigation. 74 For example, the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA) 75 required federal
prisons to adopt grievance procedures. 76 Shortly thereafter, all
fifty states implemented grievance procedures. 77 As a result of
CRIPA and the concern for prisoners’ rights, prison litigation in
federal court increased dramatically throughout the 1980s and
1990s. 78
However, this growth eventually stalled when Congress
passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) 79 “in
response to what Congress considered to be an abuse of the judicial
process by inmates.” 80 The goal of the PLRA is to “make it more
difficult for prisoners to take their [constitutional] complaints to
federal court” 81 and it has largely been successful in doing so. 82
hire more guards and appropriate more funds to improve infrastructure).
73. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1357 (explaining how creating a
“centralized system with a consistent set of internal procedures and
regulations . . . would both dismantle the broken system and effectively secure
prisoners’ rights”); MUSHLIN, supra note 71, at 15–16 (explaining that the civil
rights movement sparked the necessary change to end the “hands-off doctrine”).
74. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1359 (describing the “causal
relationship between the success of prisoners’ rights litigation and universal
adoption of inmate grievance procedures”).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2018).
76. See Swearingen, supra note 70, at 1361 (explaining how CRIPA
“provided for grievance procedures in all federal prisons, [and] provided powerful
motivation for states to adopt similar procedures”).
77. See id. (“By 1983, each of the fifty states had adopted some form of
grievance procedures in their adult penitentiary systems.”).
78. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559
(2003) (providing prisoner suit statistics and explaining that prisoner suits
constituted nineteen percent of the federal civil docket and fifteen percent of all
trials in 1995).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018).
80. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 566–67 (4th ed., vol. 3 2009).
81. Michael Irvine, Chapter 17: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331
to Obtain Relief from Violations of Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305,
305 (2000).
82. “The PLRA has had an impact on inmate litigation that is hard to
exaggerate; . . . [by] 2001 filings by inmates were down forty-three percent since
their peak in 1995, notwithstanding a simultaneous twenty-three percent
increase in the number of people incarcerated nationwide.” Schlanger, supra note
78, at 1559–60 (footnotes omitted). The PLRA “drastically altered the corrections
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With respect to prisoner grievance submissions, the PLRA requires
prisoners to exhaust all internal administrative remedies to
resolve the grievance before filing a claim in federal court. 83 Before
the PLRA, exhaustion was not a mandatory prerequisite to filing. 84
The PLRA is still in effect today and severely restricts prisoners’
ability to seek redress for constitutional violations. 85
III. Supervisory Liability in the Second Circuit and the Colon
Split
Supervisory officials may be held responsible for
constitutional violations under one of two doctrines: (1) direct
liability; or (2) supervisory liability. 86 As its name suggests, direct
liability occurs when the supervisor directly causes the
constitutional violation, either by personally causing the injury or
directing a subordinate (i.e. an agent) to cause the injury. 87
Supervisory liability, on the other hand, holds the supervisor
responsible for a subordinate’s constitutional violation when the
supervisor did not directly cause the injury as required by direct
liability. 88
The test for supervisory liability varies by jurisdiction, but
every test contains three elements: (1) a subordinate directly
litigation environment, imposing filing fees on even indigent inmates, requiring
them to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing lawsuits, and limiting
their damages and attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1559.
83. See MUSHLIN, supra note 80, at 59 (“Under the PLRA, exhaustion is no
longer discretionary; it is mandatory.”).
84. See id. at 598 (explaining that the PLRA “made a dramatic 180-degree
change” in imposing strict exhaustion requirements).
85. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text (describing how the PLRA
reversed some of the advancements made by CRIPA and the civil rights
movement).
86. See Evans, supra note 9, at 110–11 (distinguishing between the situation
where an individual personally causes an injury and the situation where an
individual causes an injury through the acts of another).
87. See id. at 111–13 (“For a plaintiff to prevail on a constitutional tort claim
using a theory of direct liability, she must show that she suffered a constitutional
injury at the hands of the defendant.”).
88. See id. at 113–14 (describing supervisory liability as “causally
attenuated liability” because the supervisor is usually one step removed from the
underlying constitutional tort).
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causes a constitutional violation; 89 (2) the supervisor possesses the
requisite mens rea for culpability; 90 and (3) the supervisor’s
personal involvement 91 creates an affirmative link between the
supervisor’s conduct and the subordinate’s unconstitutional act. 92
There is considerable disagreement over what constitutes
personal involvement in the third element. 93 Each circuit has
adopted a different definition of personal involvement. 94 This
definitional distinction serves as the launching point for the
remainder of the Note, which focuses on supervisory liability in the
Second Circuit.
A. Pre-Iqbal Liability in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit established the test for personal
involvement in Colon v. Coughlin. 95 Under this test, a supervisory
89. See id. at 114 (describing how “the entire claim falls” against a supervisor
unless the subordinate is directly liable for the unconstitutional act).
90. See id. at 117–18 (noting that some jurisdictions require that the
supervisor display deliberate indifference to the subordinate’s unconstitutional
actions, whereas other jurisdictions require that supervisor have actual
knowledge of such actions).
91. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (clarifying that a
supervisor is not personally involved under a theory of vicarious liability or
respondeat superior).
92. See Evans, supra note 9, at 114–18 (summarizing and condensing the
elements of supervisory liability as found across the various circuits).
93. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors?
Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates
in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 278–81 (2012)
(discussing how it is more difficult to hold supervisors liable for constitutional
violations when they are one step removed from the wrongful act).
94. See Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A]
supervisor may only be held liable where (1) the behavior of [his] subordinates
results in a constitutional violation and (2) the [supervisor’s] action or inaction
was affirmatively link[ed] to the behavior . . . .” (quotation and citation omitted));
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Personal involvement
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.”); Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
plaintiff must show either the supervisor personally was involved in the
constitutional violation or that there is a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation.” (quotation and citation
omitted)).
95. 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995).
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defendant is only personally involved in a constitutional violation
if:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged
constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed
of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the
wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance
of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly
negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the
wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on
information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring. 96

Colon “permitted courts to find that supervisory officials were
‘personally involved’ in any constitutional deprivation, regardless
of the elements of the underlying constitutional provision at issue,
if plaintiffs could prove any one of th[e]se five factors.” 97 District
courts in the Second Circuit unquestioningly applied Colon’s
straightforward test when analyzing personal involvement. 98
However, the Supreme Court’s 2009 opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
disrupted the supervisory liability doctrine. 99
B. The Iqbal Decision
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI arrested
Javaid Iqbal for crimes relating to his immigration documents. 100
Iqbal pleaded guilty, spent time in jail, and returned to his native
96. Id. at 873 (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir.
1986)).
97. Marom v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-2017, 2016 WL 916424, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016).
98. See, e.g., Harnett v. Barr, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511, 523–24 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(before Iqbal) (listing all five Colon factors as the starting point for the personal
involvement discussion before dismissing several supervisory defendants from
the suit because they did not satisfy any of the Colon factors).
99. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058,
at *16–17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (noting that Iqbal may have changed the test
for personal involvement and questioning whether Colon still governs).
100. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1
n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (explaining that the United States charged Iqbal
with “conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud with identification” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1028).

SUPERVISORS WITHOUT SUPERVISION

473

country of Pakistan. 101 Upon his return to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a
Bivens 102 action against numerous federal officials, including
former FBI Director Robert Mueller and Attorney General John
Ashcroft. 103 Iqbal alleged that Mueller and Ashcroft violated his
First and Fifth Amendment rights by implementing penal policies
in the wake of September 11th that unconstitutionally targeted
Arab Muslim men. 104 Ashcroft and Mueller filed a motion to
dismiss Iqbal’s complaint and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify pleading standards under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 105
Although Iqbal shook the legal world in its discussion
concerning pleading standards, 106 the opinion also contains an
oft-overlooked holding about supervisory liability. 107 Before
addressing the pleading issue, the Supreme Court briefly
addressed whether Ashcroft and Mueller could be liable as
101. See Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petitioners’ Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 3, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-1015), ECF No. 9
(explaining that the United States deported Iqbal to Pakistan following his
imprisonment).
102. A Bivens suit is “an implied private action for damages against federal
officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676 (citation omitted). A Bivens action is the “federal analog to suits brought
against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C § 1983.” Id. at 675–76 (citation omitted).
103. See id. at 668 (noting that Iqbal named over fifty defendants in his § 1983
lawsuit ranging from low-level prison guards to high-ranking government
officials).
104. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-cv-01809), ECF No. 35 (alleging that
Ashcroft and Mueller “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject [Iqbal] to [harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest”).
105. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669–70 (explaining that the Eastern District of
New York denied the motion to dismiss and the Second Circuit affirmed this
ruling on appeal).
106. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading
Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J.
235, 239–40 (2012) (noting that dismissal rates increased “from sixty-six percent
to seventy-five percent” after Iqbal); Evans, supra note 9, at 105 (explaining that
“it was like a nuclear weapon had gone off” when the court decided Iqbal).
107. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77 (explaining that in a § 1983 or Bivens
action alleging discrimination in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, a
supervisor is only liable for the discriminatory acts of a subordinate if the
supervisor also acted with a discriminatory purpose).
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supervisors for the discriminatory actions of their subordinates. 108
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “a supervisor’s
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose
amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.” 109 Rather,
“[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action . . . the term ‘supervisory
liability’ is a misnomer . . . . [and] [e]ach Government official . . . is
only liable for his or her own misconduct.” 110 Furthermore, just as
“purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens
liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination[,]
the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising
from his or her superintendent responsibilities.” 111
In light of this powerful language, circuit courts did not know
whether the concept of supervisory liability survived Iqbal. 112 In
fact, Justice Souter in his dissent lamented that the “majority is
not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating
Bivens supervisory liability entirely.” 113 Iqbal’s supervisory
liability holding threw the circuits into complete disarray.
C. Post-Iqbal Liability in the Second Circuit
A deep circuit split emerged as the courts struggled to discern
Iqbal’s impact on supervisory liability. 114 The Fourth Circuit, Fifth
Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit (the “Avoidant
Family”) did not believe that Iqbal effected supervisory liability, so

108. See id. at 675 (addressing the question of substantive law posed by
Iqbal’s complaint).
109. Id. at 677.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. On one end of the spectrum, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits ignored Iqbal and continued to apply their pre-Iqbal supervisory liability
tests in full. See Evans, supra note 9, at 131 (describing these circuits as the
“Avoidant Family”). The Seventh Circuit landed on the opposite end of the
spectrum by completely abandoning its pre-Iqbal supervisory liability test. See
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“The supervisor
can be liable only if he wants the unconstitutional or illegal conduct to occur.”
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009))).
113. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 693 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. See Evans, supra note 9, at 130 (discussing how the lower courts
struggled to reconcile Iqbal with existing supervisory liability doctrine).
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they continued to apply their pre-Iqbal tests. 115 On the other end
of the spectrum, the Seventh Circuit (the “Demolition Family”)
completely “abandoned its pre-Iqbal supervisory liability tests.” 116
Still, the D.C. Circuit and Eighth Circuit adopted a hybrid
approach between these extremes by retaining the supervisory
liability doctrine while limiting Iqbal’s holding to similar facts. 117
Whereas most of the circuits took a firm stance on supervisory
liability’s status after Iqbal, the Second Circuit has yet to address
the issue directly. 118 Despite several opportunities to resolve the
question, the Second Circuit has declined to clarify how Iqbal
impacts supervisory liability, if at all. 119 Without any guidance
from the Second Circuit, the district courts unsurprisingly split
over their interpretations of supervisory liability after Iqbal. 120
The various tests adopted by the district courts resemble the tests
adopted by the other circuits. 121

115. See id. at 131–39 (describing these circuits as the “Avoidant Family”
because they “have made no changes to the content of or rationale behind their
respective tests”).
116. See id. at 146–51 (explaining how the Seventh Circuit strictly interpreted
Iqbal and completely disallowed supervisory liability, unless the supervisor was
directly involved in the unconstitutional act).
117. See id. at 171–78 (explaining that these circuits “apply [Iqbal’s]
supervisory liability holding only when the underlying constitutional tort imposes
a mens rea of purpose or intent”).
118. See id. at 159–64 (noting that the Second Circuit’s post-Iqbal decisions
merely acknowledge “the supervisory liability question without resolving it”).
119. See Jamison v. Fischer, 617 Fed. App’x 25, 28 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015)
(explaining that the Second Circuit has not determined whether Iqbal altered
personal involvement analysis); Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir.
2014) (explaining that the Second Circuit has “not yet determined the contours of
the supervisory liability test . . . after Iqbal”).
120. See infra Part III.C (discussing how some district courts hold that Iqbal
supersedes Colon, others limit Iqbal to its facts, and still others avoid the issue
completely).
121. In other words, the district courts in the Second Circuit independently
applied the same tests that the circuit courts applied. See supra notes 114–117
and accompanying text (listing the various tests adopted by the circuit courts).
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1. The Restrictive Courts

Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hospital, 122 decided just one month
after the Supreme Court’s Iqbal opinion, was the first district court
case in the Second Circuit to thoroughly analyze Iqbal’s effect on
Colon. 123 Prisoner Jerome Bellamy brought a § 1983 claim against
Dr. Lester Wright, a medical supervisor, 124 alleging that Wright
failed to prevent further injury to the plaintiff after learning of his
grievances. 125 Bellamy wrote to Wright on several occasions,
complaining of inadequate medical treatment. 126 Wright never
personally responded to Bellamy’s letters or had any other contact
with him. 127
However, other medical staff did respond to all of Bellamy’s
letters. 128 Under Colon’s second factor, Wright’s failure to remedy
Bellamy’s injury would likely be enough to render him personally
liable as a supervisor. 129 However, the district court held that
Wright was not personally involved because Iqbal invalidated the
second Colon factor. 130 Lending support to this reasoning, the
122. No. 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009).
123. See id. at *4–6 (discussing the issue without referencing any Second
Circuit or district court precedent).
124. See id. at *1 (explaining that Wright’s supervisory responsibilities as
Chief Medical Officer included “the development and operation of a system to
provide necessary medical care for inmates in the custody of the DOCS”).
125. See id. at *2 (discussing Bellamy’s epididymectomy, which subsequently
caused him to have testosterone and cortisol deficiencies).
126. See id. at *1 (explaining that Bellamy “claimed, first, that a female officer
entered his cell and retrieved his HIV medication, second, that an officer
eavesdropped on a medical consultation with his doctor, and, third, that he went”
several days without HIV, Cortisol, and testosterone treatment).
127. See id. (mentioning that “Wright’s office routinely receives hundreds of
letters each year, addressed to him personally from inmates throughout the
DOCS system and from individuals writing on behalf of inmates”).
128. See id. at *2 (explaining that Wright’s staff screened Bellamy’s letters
and forwarded them to the Regional Health Services Administrator or Regional
Medical Director).
129. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The personal
involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that . . . the
defendant, after being informed of the [constitutional] violation through a report
or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong . . . .”).
130. See Bellamy, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6 (explaining that the second Colon
factor “impose[s] the exact types of supervisory liability that Iqbal
eliminated—situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a
constitutional violation committed by a subordinate”).
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Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in an
unpublished opinion on appeal. 131
Other courts in the Second Circuit followed Bellamy’s lead in
ruling that Iqbal abrogated all but the first and third Colon
factors. 132 For example, in Butler v. Suffolk County, 133 the district
court did not find supervisory liability where the supervisors
neither directly contributed to the constitutional violation, nor
created a policy that allowed for unconstitutional practices to
occur. 134 Weighing in on the intra-circuit split, the court aligned
itself with the Bellamy court in ruling that “only two of the
Colon-factors—direct participation and the creation of a policy or
custom—survive Iqbal.” 135
2. The Hybrid Courts
Contrary to Bellamy and Butler, other courts in the Second
Circuit continue to apply all of the Colon factors and limit Iqbal’s
supervisory liability holding to similar facts. 136 In Williams v.

131. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 387 Fed. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2010)
(affirming the district court’s “judgment for substantially the same reasons”).
132. See Betances v. Fischer, 144 F. Supp. 3d 441, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(explaining that a supervisor is only personally involved if she “participates
directly in the alleged constitutional violation, creates a policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occur, or allows such practices to continue”);
Williams v. King, 56 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (declining to consider
the second, fourth, or fifth Colon factors in analyzing the personal involvement of
the supervisory defendants).
133. 289 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
134. See id. at 94–95 (dismissing the prisoner’s § 1983 claim against the
supervisory defendants for lack of personal involvement).
135. Id. at 94 n.8.
136. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058,
at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (“In this case because Plaintiff’s claims do not
require a showing of discriminatory intent and are based on the unreasonable
conduct standard of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will apply [all of] the
Colon factors.”); Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that
all five Colon factors survive where the constitutional violate at issue does not
require a showing of discriminatory intent.”); Lebron v. Mrzyglod, No.
14-CV-10290, 2017 WL 365493, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017) (“Iqbal’s limitation
on supervisory liability applies only to claims for discrimination under the First
or Fifth Amendments.”).
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Adams, 137 a prisoner brought a § 1983 suit against prison
supervisors who allegedly learned their subordinates were
providing inadequate medical care, but failed to fix the
situation. 138 In analyzing the supervisors’ personal involvement,
the district court noted that courts are split as to whether Colon
survives Iqbal. 139
The district court adopted the hybrid approach, explaining
“that the Colon analysis still applies where the constitutional
claim asserted does not require a showing of discriminatory
intent.” 140 In this case the plaintiff alleged medical indifference,
which does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, so the
district court applied all five Colon factors. 141 The court reasoned
that Iqbal only discussed supervisory liability in the context of
claims involving discriminatory intent, so its impact on
supervisory liability should be limited to those circumstances. 142
3. The Avoidant Courts
Most recently, district courts in the Second Circuit have
avoided weighing in on the Iqbal debate altogether. 143 These
avoidant courts simply note that there is an intra-circuit split on
137. No. 9:18-CV-1041, 2019 WL 350215 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2019).
138. See id. at *2 (alleging that the prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiff’s “chronic neck and lower back spinal conditions that
required use of backbrace [sic]”).
139. See id. at *7 (“In this Circuit, ‘Iqbal has engendered conflict . . . about the
continued vitality of the supervisory liability test set forth in Colon’ . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
140. Id.
141. See id. (holding that Colon survives Iqbal so long as the underlying
constitutional claim does not involve discriminatory intent).
142. See id. (noting that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a [§ 1983]
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue” (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009))).
143. See Coleman v. Cuomo, No. 9:18-CV-0390, 2019 WL 257933, at *4 n.1
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2019) (discussing how the Second Circuit has yet to resolve the
Colon split and that “[f]or purposes of this Decision and Order, the Court assumes
that all five categories under Colon remain valid”); Amaya v. Ballyshear LLC, 295
F. Supp. 3d 204, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that “[t]he court will assume,
for purposes of this motion, that Colon remains good law” after noting the
intra-circuit split).
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the issue of supervisory liability and will continue to apply Colon
until told otherwise. 144
For example, in Franks v. Russo 145 a prisoner brought a § 1983
claim against prison officials relating to inadequate medical
treatment and abuse. 146 The supervisory defendants argued that
they were not personally involved in the alleged misconduct. 147 In
analyzing the defendants’ personal involvement, the district court
acknowledged the intra-circuit confusion; however, without any
further analysis, the district court simply “assume[d] that all five
categories under Colon remain valid.” 148 The split is so welldefined at this point that the district courts have given up trying
to resolve the issue themselves. 149 The Second Circuit must step in
and resolve the issue.

144. See Lebron, 2017 WL 365493, at *4 (explaining that “[s]ome courts have
simply concluded that, in the absence of Second Circuit precedent suggesting
otherwise, they will continue to apply the Colon test”).
145. No. 9:18-CV-1282, 2018 WL 6674293 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018).
146. See id. at *2–3 (alleging that the plaintiff did not receive appropriate
medical accommodations after he suffered a mental breakdown and that the
prison staff denied him treatment as punishment for filing grievances).
147. See id. at *5 (stating that the plaintiff’s complaint simply named the
supervisors as defendants without alleging supporting facts to find personal
involvement).
148. Id. at *3 n.4; see also Pritchard v. Cty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-534, 2018 WL
1036165, at *3 n.6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018) (“[T]he Court assumes that Colon
remains an accurate statement of the law in the Second Circuit.”); Muhammad v.
Cohen, No. 13-cv-1422, 2015 WL 1973330, at *7 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2015)
(“Since Iqbal, courts in this district have disagreed over whether the Colon
categories continue to apply, and the Second Circuit has yet to provide
guidance . . . . The Court’s analysis here assumes that the Colon categories
continue to apply.”).
149. See Aponte v. Fischer, No. 14-CV-3989, 2018 WL 1136614, at *8 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (explaining that the district court will continue to apply
all five Colon factors until the Supreme Court or Second Circuit hold otherwise);
El-Hanafi v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-2072, 2015 WL 72804, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2015) (noting that the court will continue to apply Colon in full “absent
any contrary directive from the Second Circuit” (quoting Vazquez-Mentado v.
Buitron, 995 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96–97 (N.D.N.Y. 2014))).
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D. What Does This All Mean?

The split regarding Colon’s viability boils down to competing
interpretations of Iqbal’s scope. 150 According to courts that
continue to apply Colon in full, Iqbal only limits supervisory
liability to factually similar situations where the underlying
constitutional violation involves discriminatory intent by the
subordinate. 151 Therefore, when the underlying claim does not
require a showing of discriminatory intent, the personal
involvement test set forth in Colon still applies. 152 Courts rejecting
this analysis, as in Bellamy, reason that Iqbal restricts supervisory
liability even in situations where the underlying constitutional
violation does not involve discriminatory intent. 153 In other words,
Iqbal is not limited to the facts of the case.
1. Observations
Despite the confusion and uncertainty surrounding
supervisory liability due to the Second Circuit’s reluctance to
address the issue, some indications of clarity are slowly
emerging. 154 First, and most notably, the majority of district courts
150. See Evans, supra note 9, at 105 (“The Supreme Court has not explained
what it meant in Iqbal in the years since it was decided, and few scholars have
touched on this area of law.”).
151. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[W]here
the claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, the
personal-involvement analysis set forth in Colon should still apply . . . .”); Sheldon
Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability after
Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 295 (2010) (explaining that Iqbal requires
supervisors to have “the same state of mind as that for the underlying
constitutional violation”).
152. See Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It
was with intent-based constitutional claims in mind, specifically racial
discrimination, that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that ‘a supervisor’s
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the
supervisor’s violating the Constitution.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677 (2009))).
153. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (establishing the blanket rule that the second,
fourth, and fifth Colon factors “impose the exact types of supervisory liability that
Iqbal eliminated—situations where the supervisor knew of and acquiesced to a
constitutional violation committed by a subordinate”).
154. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013)
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in the Second Circuit adopt the hybrid approach and continue to
apply Colon when the underlying constitutional claim does not
involve discriminatory intent. 155 Bellamy and its progeny are in
the clear minority in holding that Iqbal limits Colon’s scope. 156 In
fact, many of the cases discrediting Colon, including Bellamy, were
decided by Judge Shira Scheindlin 157 who has since retired. 158
Given these developments, the Second Circuit may not believe it is
necessary to definitively rule on the issue. 159
(mentioning that Iqbal may have affected the Colon test, but avoiding the issue
by explaining that regardless of Iqbal, the supervisor in that case was not
personally involved under any of the Colon factors).
155. See Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No. 6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058,
at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (explaining that “neither the Second Circuit nor
the Supreme Court has endorsed” the restrictive courts’ approach (quoting Cano
v. City of New York, 44 F. Supp. 3d 324, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))); Amaya v.
Ballyshear LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 204, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussing whether
Iqbal supersedes Colon); Vazquez-Mentado v. Buitron, 995 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96–97
(N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that, absent
any contrary directive from the Second Circuit, all five Colon factors survive
where . . . the constitutional violation at issue does not require a showing of
discriminatory intent.”).
156. See Doe v. New York, 97 F. Supp. 3d 5, 12 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (mentioning
that the majority of courts have continued to apply all five Colon factors and that
“neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court” has supported the
interpretation that only the first and third factors survive Iqbal (quoting Cano v.
City of New York, 44 F. Supp. 3d 324, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))).
157. See Betances v. Fischer, 144 F. Supp. 3d 441, 449 n.48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(Scheindlin, J.) (finding that Iqbal abrogates the second, fourth, and fifth Colon
factors); Williams v. King, 56 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(Scheindlin, J.) (same); Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 n.102
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Scheindlin, J.) (same); Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp.
3d 426, 448 n.155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Scheindlin, J.) (same); Spear v. Hugles, No. 08
Civ. 4026, 2009 WL 2176725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (Scheindlin, J.)
(same); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (Scheindlin, J.) (same).
158. See Benjamin Weiser, Shira Scheindlin, Judge Behind Stop-and-Frisk
Ruling, Will Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/5Z39-4VQY
(last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (announcing Judge Scheindlin’s resignation from the
bench of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York effective
April 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Nevertheless,
Judge Scheindlin is not alone as other judges have also sided with her. See, e.g.,
Butler v. Suffolk County, 289 F.R.D. 80, 94 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (Seybert, J.)
(finding that Iqbal abrogates the second, fourth, and fifth Colon factors); Bryant
v. County of Monroe, No. 09-CV-6415, 2010 WL 4877799, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov.
22, 2010) (Siragusa, J.) (same).
159. Circuit courts often decide cases when an intra-circuit split emerges. The
Second Circuit may not believe that there is enough of a division to justify issuing
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Second, a recent unpublished summary order 160 issued by the
Second Circuit in Delee v. Hannigan 161 also suggests that all five
Colon factors may survive Iqbal. 162 Prisoner Maurice Delee
brought a § 1983 suit against several supervisory prison officials
alleging mistreatment during his incarceration. 163 The district
court granted the supervisory defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of personal involvement and the Second Circuit reviewed for
error. 164
In affirming the motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit listed
all five Colon factors in its definition of personal involvement. 165
On its surface, this indicates that Iqbal does not abrogate Colon,
but the court’s reasoning does not support such an expansive
reading of Colon’s presence in the opinion. 166 The Second Circuit
listed the five Colon factors and then explained that the “amended
complaint makes no allegation as to the involvement of [the
supervisory defendants], other than the titles of their
employment.” 167 As such, “[t]here is therefore no well-plead
a decision on the issue. See Tillman J. Breckenridge, Petitioning for Further
Review After Losing a Federal Appeal, VA. LAW. (Oct. 2015),
https://perma.cc/AD58-BJV2 (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (mentioning that the
“strongest petition for rehearing en banc exposes a conflict between holdings
within the circuit [because] . . . . an intra-circuit split allows the petitioner to
appeal to the judges’ base sense of judicial efficiency and fairness of the process”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. See 2d Cir. R. 32.1.1 (establishing guidelines for the disposition of cases
by summary order and explaining that unpublished summary orders do not carry
precedential authority to bind the district courts in the Second Circuit).
161. 729 Fed. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2018).
162. See id. at 27 (reviewing the district court’s decision to dismiss the
plaintiff’s § 1983 suit alleging that prison guards and officials used excessive force
and retaliated against him).
163. See id. at 27–28 (claiming that several corrections officers “beat, kicked,
and sexually assaulted [the plaintiff] as retribution for seeking [a] refund” of a
disputed commissary charge).
164. See id. at 31 (“The amended complaint makes no allegation as to the
involvement of [the supervisory] defendants . . . other than the titles of their
employment.”).
165. See id. (describing the test for establishing the personal involvement of
a supervisor in a § 1983 suit).
166. See id. (affirming the district court’s decision because the plaintiff did
not allege any facts that would establish the supervisors’ personal involvement
under any of the Colon factors, even if the court accepted the alleged facts as true).
167. Id.
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allegation against any” of the supervisory defendants. 168 The court
did not substantively discuss Colon’s viability, but rather
dismissed Delee’s complaint on pleading grounds. 169
In other words, even if Colon survived in full, the outcome of
Delee would not change because the complaint did not allege
sufficient personal involvement under any of the five factors. 170 If
the complaint failed to satisfy the definition of personal
involvement under the hybrid interpretation of Iqbal, 171 it would
also fail to satisfy the definition of personal involvement under the
restrictive interpretation of Iqbal. 172 Nevertheless, the fact that
the Second Circuit approvingly cited all five factors bodes well for
Colon’s continued viability.
2. Recommendations
Even though recent trends suggest that Colon remains good
law, it is imperative that the Second Circuit issue a definitive
ruling on Iqbal’s scope because courts are avoiding the question
entirely by granting defendants qualified immunity. 173
Government officials are immune from suit and “entitled to
qualified immunity” if their actions “did not violate clearly
established law.” 174 The law is clearly established when, “at the
168. Id.
169. See id. (noting that a plaintiff’s mere reference to a supervisor’s job title
in a complaint, without more, is not enough to properly allege personal
involvement under any of the Colon factors).
170. See id. (dismissing the three supervisory defendants from the lawsuit
because there was “no well-pleaded allegation against any of [the supervisory
defendants]”).
171. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing how the hybrid interpretation
continues to apply all of the Colon factors, unless the underlying constitutional
violation imposes a mens rea of discriminatory purpose).
172. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing how the restrictive interpretation
invalidates all but the first and third Colon factors regardless of the elements of
the underlying unconstitutional act).
173. See Ojo v. United States, No. 15-cv-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“Ultimately, however, I need not resolve the question
of whether Iqbal abrogated Colon . . . . because, regardless of whether Colon’s
second category of supervisory liability survived Iqbal in such cases, the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the very uncertainty of
the governing law.”).
174. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).
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time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are]
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have
understood what he is doing violates that right.’” 175 Given the
uncertainty surrounding supervisory liability following Iqbal,
some district courts have found that the law is not clearly
established and dismiss the claims on qualified immunity
grounds. 176
For example, in Funches v. Russo 177 prisoner Funches brought
a § 1983 claim against supervisor McKoy. 178 Funches alleged that
McKoy retaliated against him for filing prison grievances in
violation of his First Amendment rights. 179 McKoy raised qualified
immunity as a defense, arguing that he did not violate any clearly
established law. 180 The Northern District of New York agreed with
McKoy, explaining that “the uncertainty inherent in the continued
viability of the Colon test implies that ‘regardless of whether
Colon’s second category of supervisory liability survived
Iqbal . . . , [the defendant is] entitled to qualified immunity based
on the very uncertainty of the governing law.’” 181 Until the Second
Circuit clarifies the contours of Iqbal and Colon, district courts can
grant qualified immunity to defendants because the law is not
clearly established. 182
175. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
176. See Funches v. Russo, No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018 WL 6381058, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (granting the supervisory defendant qualified immunity
because it is not clearly established that the second Colon factor survives Iqbal);
Ojo, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 (same).
177. No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018).
178. See id. at *6 (arguing that defendant McKoy was obligated to approve
the plaintiff’s correspondence request).
179. See Magistrate Judge’s Report-Recommendation and Order at 3,
Funches v. Russo, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (No. 9:17-CV-1292),
ECF No. 39 (alleging that defendant McKoy prevented Funches from
communicating with family members after Funches filed several complaints
against prison staff).
180. See Defendants’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Report at 10, Funches
v. Russo, 2018 WL 6381058 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (No. 9:17-CV-1292), ECF No.
40 (claiming that “no clearly established law holds that [McKoy] was required to
approve Plaintiff’s correspondence request”).
181. Funches, 2018 WL 6381058, at *7 (quoting Ojo v. United States, No.
15-CV-6089, 2018 WL 3863441, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018)).
182. See id. at *6–7 (explaining that it is unclear whether all five Colon factors
survive Iqbal).
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The Second Circuit should explicitly hold that Iqbal only limits
Colon where the underlying constitutional violation involves
discriminatory intent. 183 Iqbal’s restriction on supervisory liability
should be limited to similar facts because the opinion only
discussed supervisory liability in the context of constitutional
violations involving discriminatory conduct. 184 A careful reading of
the Supreme Court’s language supports this conclusion. 185
The Supreme Court began its discussion of supervisory
liability by explaining that “[g]overnment officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under
a theory of respondeat superior.” 186 Rather, § 1983 only imposes
liability when the government official’s own actions cause a
constitutional violation. 187 The restrictive courts interpret this
language to unequivocally conclude that only the first and third
Colon factors survive Iqbal. 188 However, this is a simplified reading
of the opinion and fails to consider the context of the case. 189
In Iqbal, the plaintiff sought to impose liability on government
supervisors for the discriminatory conduct of their subordinates. 190
The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he factors necessary to
183. See Ziemba v. Jajoie, No. 3:11-cv-00845, 2016 WL 5395265, at *7 (D.
Conn. Sept. 26, 2016) (noting that “Iqbal dealt specifically with allegations of
intentional discrimination, and the [Supreme] Court noted explicitly that the
factors necessary to establish liability ‘will vary with the constitutional provision
at issue’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009))).
184. See Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *10
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (following the majority of district courts in the Second
Circuit in holding that all five Colon factors survive when the alleged
constitutional violation does not involve discriminatory conduct).
185. See Drew v. City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 0594, 2016 WL 4533660, at
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016) (explaining that the restrictive courts, such as
Bellamy, “may overstate Iqbal’s impact on supervisory liability”).
186. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
187. See id. (explaining that “vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and
§ 1983 suits”).
188. See Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ 1801, 2009 WL 1835939,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (concluding that Iqbal abrogates Colon in every
situation, regardless of the underlying constitutional violation alleged).
189. See Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that the restrictive courts’ interpretation “may overstate Iqbal’s
impact on supervisory liability”).
190. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666–67 (naming the Attorney General and FBI
Director as defendants in the lawsuit because lower-level government officials
allegedly profiled the plaintiff because of his race, religion, and national origin).
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establish a Bivens [and § 1983] violation will vary with the
constitutional provision at issue.” 191 In other words, the elements
of a § 1983 claim mirror the elements of the underlying
constitutional violation. 192 When discrimination is an element of
the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose to prevail on a
§ 1983 claim. 193 In such cases, the defendant-official, whether a
supervisor or subordinate, is only liable if they acted with
discriminatory purpose. 194
The plaintiff in Iqbal argued that supervisors should be liable
for the discriminatory conduct of their subordinates as long as the
supervisor knew of, or acquiesced to, such discrimination. 195 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that “purpose
rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the
subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds
true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her
superintendent responsibilities.” 196 A supervisor is only liable for
the discriminatory actions of their subordinates if the supervisor
also possesses discriminatory purpose in acting or failing to act. 197

191. Id. at 676.
192. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other
grounds by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (explaining that liability is
appropriate when a defendant acts with deliberate indifference and the
“underlying constitutional violation requires no more than deliberate
indifference”).
193. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination
in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear
that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose.”).
194. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Apple, No. 9:15-CV-1269, 2017 WL 3887908, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017) (“The majority of district courts, however, have held that
all five Colon factors survive where the constitutional violation at issue does not
require a showing of discriminatory intent.”).
195. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (advocating for an expansive application of
supervisory liability in which supervisors would be vicariously liable for the
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates).
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See Marom v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-2017, 2016 WL 916424, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016) (explaining that Iqbal “only requires that a supervisor’s
action—whether
direct
or
through
‘his
or
her
superintendent
responsibilities’— must itself violate the terms of the constitutional provision at
issue” (citation omitted)).
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The Supreme Court only analyzed supervisory liability in the
context of constitutional violations involving discrimination. 198
The Court did not say anything about non-discriminatory
constitutional violations. 199 Rather, the “Supreme Court limited its
holding to those claims alleging ‘invidious discrimination in
contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments.’” 200 Therefore,
“[t]he most natural reading . . . is that Iqbal’s limitation on
supervisory liability applies only to claims for discrimination
under the First or Fifth Amendments.” 201 Iqbal’s holding does not
affect supervisory liability analysis of any other unconstitutional
act that does not involve discriminatory purpose. 202
Properly read, Iqbal simply clarifies that a defendant, whether
a subordinate or supervisor, must individually satisfy the elements
of the underlying constitutional violation. 203 Prior to Iqbal, the
Colon test “permitted courts to find that the supervisory officials
were ‘personally involved’ in any constitutional deprivation,
regardless of the elements of the underlying constitutional
provision at issue, if the plaintiffs could prove any one of those five
198. See Lebron v. Mrzyglod, No. 14-CV-10290, 2017 WL 365493, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017) (“The Supreme Court, however, said nothing about
liability for defendants who failed to adequately supervise their subordinates, nor
did the Court say anything about what is required to establish personal
involvement under Bivens or § 1983, the question addressed by Colon.”).
199. See id. (“The issue addressed by the Court, instead, was whether
discriminatory intent by a subordinate could be imputed to a supervisor—the
Supreme Court concluded that it could not . . . .”).
200. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
201. Id.
202. See id.
[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that a supervisor could not be held
liable for . . . failing to correct a constitutional violation presented
through a direct appeal, discharging her supervisory duties with gross
negligence, or acting with deliberate indifference in failing to act on
information that unconstitutional conduct was occurring.
See also Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“It was
with intent-based constitutional claims in mind, specifically racial
discrimination, that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a supervisor’s
mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the
supervisor’s violating the Constitution.”).
203. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d on other
grounds by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (“The proper inquiry is not the
name we bestow on a particular theory or standard, but rather whether that
standard—be it deliberate indifference, punitive intent, or discriminatory
intent—reflects the elements of the underlying constitutional tort.”).
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factors.” 204 Iqbal only implicates personal involvement and
abrogates Colon for discriminatory-based claims. 205 However,
absent an allegation of discriminatory intent, Colon survives in
full. 206
IV. Personal Involvement in the Second Circuit and the McKenna
Question
In addition to the Colon split, the Second Circuit laid the
groundwork for another intra-circuit split 207 in McKenna v.
Wright 208 when it questioned “whether an adjudicator’s rejection of
an administrative grievance would make him liable for the conduct
complained of.” 209 In this case, Edward McKenna, a prisoner,
brought a § 1983 claim against various doctors and non-medical

204. Marom, 2016 WL 916424, at *14; see also Turkmen, 718 F.3d at 250
(“Prior to Iqbal, this Court recognized claims against a supervisory defendant so
long as the defendant was personally involved with the alleged constitutional
violation.”).
205. See Zenon v. Downey, No. 9:18-CV-0458, 2018 WL 6702851, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2018) (“‘Iqbal does not preclude . . . claims [against government
officers] premised on deliberate indifference,’ as opposed to a purposefully illegal
policy or practice, ‘when the underlying constitutional violation requires no more
than deliberate indifference.’” (quoting Turkmen v. Hasty, 718 F.3d 218, 250 (2d
Cir. 2015))).
206. See Evans, supra note 9, at 171 (explaining that the hybrid courts “apply
[Iqbal’s] supervisory liability holding only when the underlying constitutional tort
imposes a mens rea of purpose or intent. Where the underlying tort requires
something less than intent[,] . . . [these courts] follow[] [their] pre-Iqbal
precedent” under Colon); see also Montanez v. City of Syracuse, No.
6:16-cv-00550, 2019 WL 315058, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (“The Court
agrees with the reasoning of the cases holding that the Colon analysis may still
apply where the claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent,
‘insofar as it is “consistent with the particular constitutional provision alleged to
have been violated.”’” (citation omitted)).
207. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Recent
cases dealing with the issue of personal liability arising from the defendant’s
involvement in the prison grievance process have struggled with the dicta left by
the Circuit in McKenna.”); Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (explaining that after McKenna, “courts in this Circuit are divided
regarding whether review and denial of a grievance constitutes personal
involvement in the underlying alleged unconstitutional act”).
208. 386 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 2004).
209. Id. at 437.
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supervisors for inadequate medical treatment. 210 McKenna argued
that one of the supervisory defendants, T.J. Miller, 211 was
personally involved in denying McKenna medical treatment by
rejecting his grievance. 212 This argument falls within the scope of
the second and fifth Colon factors. 213 However, the Second Circuit
ignored this argument and instead found Miller’s personal
involvement under the third Colon factor, 214 explaining that
McKenna was injured under Miller’s medical treatment system
and policy. 215 In avoiding the grievance issue, the Second Circuit
left unanswered the question: is a supervisor personally involved
in a constitutional violation if they reject a prisoner’s grievance?
(hereinafter “the McKenna question”).
A. The Different Tests to Answer the McKenna Question
The district courts in the Second Circuit split in answering the
McKenna question and have adopted different tests to do so. 216
210. See id. at 434–35 (alleging that the prison’s medical officials’ delay in
treating the plaintiff for Hepatitis C caused further medical complications
including cirrhosis of the liver, jaundice, ascites, and hemorrhaging).
211. See id. at 435 (describing Miller’s position as the Deputy Superintendent
of the prison).
212. See id. at 436–37 (claiming that the defendants denied “adequate
medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment” and “acted with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need”).
213. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding personal
involvement where a supervisory defendant “after being informed of the violation
through a report or appeal, fail[s] to remedy the wrong” or “exhibit[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating
that unconstitutional acts were occurring”).
214. See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437–38 (“Miller was properly retained in the
lawsuit at this stage, not simply because he rejected the grievance, but because
he is alleged, as Deputy Superintendent for Administration at [the prison], to
have been responsible for the prison’s medical program.”); Colon, 58 F.3d at 873
(explaining that a supervisor is personally involved in a constitutional violation
if they “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices
occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom”).
215. See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 438 (“When allegations of improperly denied
medical treatment come to the attention of a supervisor of a medical program, his
adjudicating role concerning a grievance cannot insulate him from responsibility
for allowing the continuation of allegedly unlawful policies within his supervisory
responsibility.”).
216. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how some district courts find personal
involvement when a supervisor rejects a grievance alone, whereas other courts
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1. The Simplistic Approach

A small minority of courts have found sufficient personal
involvement when a supervisor simply rejects a prisoner’s
grievance without any other involvement. For example, in
Atkinson v. Selsky 217 the supervisory defendants argued that they
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly
established that denying a grievance request constituted personal
involvement. 218 The district court rejected this argument and ruled
that a “prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is
sufficient personal involvement to render that official liable under
Section 1983.” 219 The opinion did not mention or consider any other
factors that would change this outcome. 220 According to Selsky, a
supervisory defendant would be per se personally involved in a
constitutional violation whenever they deny a grievance or
grievance appeal. 221
Similarly, in Benitez v. Locastro, 222 prisoner Henry Benitez
brought a § 1983 suit challenging the conditions of his
confinement. 223 Benitez filed several grievances complaining of the
require a higher degree of involvement).
217. No. 03 Civ. 7759, 2004 WL 2319186 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004). It is
important to note that Selsky (October 15, 2004) was decided three days before
the McKenna decision (October 18, 2004). Nevertheless, Selsky still answered the
McKenna question verbatim despite the timing. Compare id. at *1 (addressing
“whether a prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is sufficient
personal involvement to render the official liable under Section 1983”), with
McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437 (questioning “whether an adjudicator’s rejection of an
administrative grievance would make him liable for the conduct complained of”).
Therefore, Selsky is still a useful tool in understanding how district courts in the
Second Circuit approach the McKenna question.
218. See Selsky, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1 (petitioning the district court to
reconsider a magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the supervisory
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds); see
also infra Part IV.B (explaining how government officials are immune from suit,
unless their actions violate clearly established law).
219. Selsky, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1.
220. See id. (“[A] considerable preponderance of cases in this district hold that
a prison official’s denial of a grievance or grievance appeal is sufficient personal
involvement to render that official liable under Section 1983.”).
221. See id. (explaining that the law clearly establishes a supervisor’s
personal involvement in denying a prisoner’s grievance).
222. No. 9:04-CV-423, 2008 WL 4767439 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008).
223. See id. at *5–10 (alleging that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by throwing urine and dirty mop water on him, making
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prison conditions. 224 According to Benitez, supervisory defendants
Burge and Eagen reviewed his grievances, but failed to take any
remedial action. 225 In their motion for a judgment on the pleadings,
Burge and Eagen argued that they were not personally involved in
the underlying violation. 226 The district court disagreed, holding
that the defendants were personally involved because they
“received, reviewed, and failed to remedy a Grievance.” 227 In other
words, a supervisory defendant is personally involved in the
underlying violation whenever they learn of the violation through
a grievance and fail to act on it. 228
This creates per se liability when these conditions are met,
similar to Selsky, but this ruling is more expansive. In Selsky, the
supervisory defendant at least responded in some manner to the
prisoner’s grievance by personally denying it. 229 Here, the
defendants simply ignored the grievance altogether. 230 This
suggests that inaction is tantamount to an affirmative denial of a
grievance and is enough to establish personal involvement.
The Selsky and Benitez courts took a simplistic approach to the
McKenna question. Without undertaking a fact-specific inquiry
into the supervisor’s actions, the courts ruled that a supervisor is
personally involved in the underlying constitutional violation by
death threats, and denying him meals).
224. See Amended Complaint ¶ 15, Benitez v. Locastro, 2008 WL 4767439
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008) (No. 9:04-CV-423), ECF No. 5 (alleging that Benitez’s
prison cell lacked “adequate air flow [which] was causing him to experience
bronchospasm and great difficulty breathing”).
225. See id. ¶¶ 16–17 (alleging that Burge and Eagen “willfully refused to
remedy the problem complained of [in the grievance], even though [they] knew
that failure to remedy the problem would continue to pose a substantial risk of
serious harm to Benitez’s health or wellbeing”).
226. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings at 13, Benitez v. Locastro, 2008 WL 4767439 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2008) (No. 9:04-CV-423), ECF No. 94 (contending that Benitez only named Burge
and Eagen as defendants because of their positions as supervisors in the prison,
which is insufficient to establish personal involvement).
227. Benitez, 2008 WL 4767439, at *13.
228. See id. (explaining that a plaintiff sufficiently alleges a supervisor’s
personal involvement if the supervisor receives and reviews a grievance but does
not take any steps to remedy the unconstitutional conduct complained of).
229. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text (detailing the
supervisors’ level of involvement in the grievance process).
230. See supra notes 225–227 and accompanying text (detailing the
supervisors’ level of involvement in the grievance process).
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the mere act of denying the prisoner’s grievance. 231 It does not
matter whether the supervisor responded to the grievance or
investigated the prisoner’s complaint. 232 As long as the supervisor
denies the grievance, or affirms the denial on appeal, these courts
will find sufficient personal involvement regardless of any other
factors. 233 However, this is the minority approach and most courts
in the Second Circuit apply one of three other tests to answer the
McKenna question—all three look beyond the simple act of denial
and search for further action by the supervisor before finding
sufficient personal involvement. 234
2. The Investigation Approach
Unlike the simplistic approach, the investigation approach
makes a distinction “between simply affirming the denial of a
grievance and reviewing and responding to a prisoner’s complaint
by undertaking some kind of investigation.” 235

231. See supra notes 219–220, 227 and accompanying text (failing to require
a higher degree of involvement by the supervisor before imposing supervisory
liability).
232. Cf. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A]
denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of
constitutional rights alleged by the plaintiff, does not establish personal
participation under § 1983.”); O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 Fed. App’x 338,
341 (6th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant’s involvement in the denial of an administrative
grievance is insufficient to show personal involvement in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct as required to state a claim under § 1983.”).
233. See Atkinson v. Selsky, No. 03 Civ. 7759, 2004 WL 2319186, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2004) (explaining that a “prison official’s denial of a grievance
or grievance appeal is sufficient personal involvement to render that official liable
under Section 1983”).
234. See infra Parts IV.A.2–3 (requiring a higher degree of involvement by
the supervisor beyond merely rejecting a grievance, such as investigating the
grievance or providing a detailed response to the prisoner).
235. Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quotation
and citation omitted); see also Ciaprazi v. Fischer, No. 13-CV-4967, 2015 WL
1315466, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (“Courts have, however, found the
requisite level of personal involvement when a defendant actually reviewed and
responded to a plaintiff’s complaint or undertook an investigation.”); Alvarado v.
Westchester County, 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[A] defendant’s
mere ‘receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally investigating or acting
[thereon], is insufficient to establish personal involvement.’” (citation omitted)).
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In Pugh v. Goord, 236 prisoners Thomas Pugh, Jr. and Clay
Chatin alleged constitutional violations arising from the prison’s
failure to provide Shi’a religious services separate from Sunni
services. 237 Both Pugh and Chatin filed several grievances
complaining of discrimination against Shi’ites. 238 In response to
the grievances, Deputy Superintendent for Program Services Ada
Perez “conducted an investigation into the claims in plaintiffs’
grievances and made recommendations.” 239 Distinguishing Perez’s
actions from the mere affirmance of a grievance denial, the district
court held that conducting an investigation was sufficient to
render Perez personally involved in the underlying constitutional
violation. 240
Similarly, in Ciaprazi v. Fischer, 241 prisoner Roberto Ciaprazi
filed grievances with the former prison commissioner, Brian
Fischer, complaining of the conditions of his confinement. 242
However, defendants Martuscello and Bellnier investigated and
responded to Ciaprazi’s grievances on Fischer’s behalf. 243
Specifically, Martuscello looked into the windows, air conditioning,
and ventilation systems in Ciaprazi’s cell block and determined
that his complaints were unwarranted. 244 Bellnier also “conferred

236. 571 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
237. See id. at 483–84 (explaining that the plaintiffs “brought this
action . . . to be free from the establishment of the Sunni Muslim religion”).
238. See id. at 499 (complaining that Sunni-led religious services do not carry
any religious significance and “as practicing Shi’ites, they are required to
participate in [religious] service[s] led by a Shi’ite”).
239. Id. at 515.
240. See id. at 515–16 (denying Perez’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
involvement because she failed to remedy an unconstitutional act after being
made aware of its occurrence).
241. No. 13-cv-4967, 2015 WL 1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015).
242. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 37–58, 201–20, Ciaprazi v. Fischer, 2015 WL
1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (No. 13-cv-4967), ECF No. 5 (alleging that the
temperature of the plaintiff’s cell was unbearably high and that the prison lights
prevented him from sleeping).
243. See id. ¶¶ 58, 218 (explaining that Fischer did not respond to Ciaprazi’s
grievances himself).
244. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’
Partial Motion to Dismiss at 12–13, Exhibit 2, Ciaprazi v. Fischer, 2015 WL
1315466 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (No. 13-cv-4967), ECF No. 102 (explaining that
Ciaprazi’s complaints “have been carefully reviewed” and denying his requests).
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with third parties to assure himself that Ciaprazi’s concerns were
resolved.” 245
The district court accordingly denied Martuscello and
Bellnier’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal involvement
because they undertook an investigation into Ciaprazi’s
grievances. 246 The supervisory defendants did more than merely
deny the plaintiff’s grievance—they dedicated time, energy, and
resources to reviewing the complaints. 247 When the defendants
demonstrate such a high degree of commitment to an alleged
constitutional violation, they will be deemed personally involved
for supervisory liability purposes under the investigation
approach. 248
Despite its appealing rationale, the investigation approach
may have unintended consequences by disincentivizing
supervisors to investigate prisoner grievances. 249 There is a strong
“possibility that officials will be over-deterred, or chilled, in
performing their duties because they fear the consequences if they
make a constitutional error.” 250 If the supervisor does not
investigate the grievance, courts following the investigation
approach will not be held personally involved in the constitutional
violation. 251 Therefore, supervisors will not investigate grievances
245. Ciaprazi, 2015 WL 1315466, at *9.
246. See id. (finding the supervisory defendants personally involved in the
underlying alleged constitutional violations because their actions went beyond
merely denying a grievance).
247. See supra notes 244–245 and accompanying text (detailing how the
supervisors personally investigated the plaintiff’s grievances to determine their
merit).
248. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(explaining that the investigation approach makes a distinction “between simply
affirming the denial of a grievance and reviewing and responding to a prisoner’s
complaint by undertaking some kind of investigation” (quotation and citation
omitted)).
249. See Joshua J. Fougere, Paying for Prisoner Suits: How the Source of
Damages Impacts State Correctional Agencies’ Behavior, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 283, 296 (2010) (“The classic concern with creating government liability is
that it will over-deter conduct and chill officers.”).
250. Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of
Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 910 (2010).
251. See Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (“[A] defendant’s mere ‘receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally
investigating or acting [thereon], is insufficient to establish personal
involvement.’” (citation omitted)).
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and may simply issue blanket rejections to minimize their risk of
becoming personally involved in the constitutional tort. 252
3. The Detailed Response Approach
The detailed response approach makes a distinction “between
a pro forma denial of a grievance and a ‘detailed and specific’
response to a grievance’s allegations.” 253 In Long v. Annucci, 254
Vincent Long filed prison grievances complaining of the conditions
in the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment program (ASAT)
dorm. 255 Prison Superintendent N. Doldo responded to the
grievances and validated Long’s complaints, yet failed to resolve
the situation. 256 The district court explained that Doldo was
personally involved in the underlying constitutional violation
because he “provide[d] a detailed and specific response to [Long’s]
grievance rather than a pro forma denial.” 257 The court focused on
the nature of the supervisor’s response, rather than the mere fact
of the denial itself, to find personal involvement. 258
The district court in Johnson v. Fischer 259 similarly adopted
the detailed response approach. Prisoner Kevin Johnson brought a
§ 1983 suit alleging that he was exposed to toxic levels of second
hand smoke, bird feces, and mold while incarcerated. 260 Johnson
252. See supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text (discussing why the
investigation approach disincentivizes supervisors to investigate prisoner
grievances).
253. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citation omitted); see also Brooks v.
Chappius, 450 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that “personal
involvement will not be found unless ‘the supervisor’s response is detailed and
specific’” (citation omitted)).
254. No. 9:17-cv-0916, 2018 WL 4473404 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018).
255. See id. at *2 (alleging that the plaintiff’s placement in the ASAT dorm
exacerbated the pinched nerves in his back, hip, and foot because he could not
stretch as instructed by his doctor).
256. See id. at *5 (explaining that Doldo “acknowledged Plaintiff was
medically excused from all [ASAT] programs at the time, and yet Plaintiff
remained in the ASAT dorm”).
257. Id.
258. See id. (denying Doldo’s motion to dismiss Long’s claims for lack of
personal involvement).
259. No. 9:12-CV-0210, 2015 WL 670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015).
260. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2–4, Johnson v. Fischer, 2015 WL
670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. 9:12-CV-0210), ECF No. 38 (alleging that
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filed several grievances complaining of these prison conditions
with supervisory defendant Harold Graham. 261 Responding to the
grievances, Graham directed Johnson to “address concerns
regarding staff smoking to a supervisor and inmates smoking to
area staff, at that time, to allow for remedial action to be taken.” 262
Graham did not investigate Johnson’s allegations, but simply
suggested a means for the plaintiff to resolve his complaint. 263
According to the district court, this response was enough to render
Graham personally involved in the underlying violation. 264 Even
though the response was short, it was more than a perfunctory,
mechanical rejection. 265 Any response that goes beyond “Grievance
Rejected” or the like is enough to determine that the supervisor is
personally involved in the violation. In other words, if the
supervisor provides an explanation for the rejection, they are
personally involved.
Similar to the investigation approach, the detailed response
approach may disincentivize supervisors to respond to prisoner
grievances. 266 There is a strong “possibility that officials will be
over-deterred, or chilled, in performing their duties because they
fear the consequences if they make a constitutional error.” 267 This
encourages supervisors to intentionally overlook prisoner
complaints and rubberstamp rejections without responding to
there is a “network of smokers that stick together [and] there is nothing being
done to stop indoor smoking”).
261. See id. at 3–4 (explaining that Johnson attempted to clean the feces and
mold and stop prison guards from smoking indoors).
262. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 32, Johnson v. Fischer, 2015 WL 670429 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 2015) (No. 9:12-CV-0210), ECF No. 89.
263. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that he “should not be required
to police the staff and or Inmates [sic]”).
264. See Johnson, 2015 WL 670429, at *8 (“Defendant Graham issued
responses to Plaintiff’s grievances that, although not lengthy, were more than
simply pro forma denials.”).
265. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(explaining that the detailed response approach makes a distinction “between a
pro forma denial of a grievance and a ‘detailed and specific’ response to a
grievance’s allegations” (citation omitted)).
266. See supra notes 249–252 and accompanying text (arguing that the
investigation approach will have a chilling effect on supervisor involvement in the
grievance process).
267. Chen, supra note 250, at 910.
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minimize their risk of becoming personally involved in a
constitutional violation. 268
4. The Ongoing Violation Approach
The ongoing violation approach looks to whether the “alleged
constitutional violation complained of in a grievance [is]
‘ongoing’ . . . such that the ‘supervisory official who reviews the
grievance can remedy [it] directly.’” 269
In Allah v. Annucci, 270 prisoner Shakim Abd Allah filed a
§ 1983 action against several prison officials for (1) preventing his
attendance at two religious events; and (2) failing to provide
adequate religious accommodations. 271 Allah filed several prison
grievances complaining that Sunni Muslims were given
preferential treatment over Shi’ite Muslims. 272 Allah named
Superintendent Thomas Griffin as a defendant and Griffin filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that he could not be liable as a
supervisor because he was not personally involved in denying
Allah religious accommodations. 273 In response, Allah argued that
Griffin was personally involved because he responded to, and
signed, Allah’s grievances, yet failed to remedy them. 274 After
briefly discussing the merits of the investigation approach and
268. See Brooks v. Chappius, 450 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
(explaining that “personal involvement will not be found unless ‘the supervisor’s
response is detailed and specific’” (citation omitted)).
269. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citation omitted); see Burton v. Lynch,
664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]his Court finds most persuasive the
many courts in this Circuit which have held that an alleged constitutional
violation complained of in an grievance must be ‘ongoing’ in order to find personal
involvement . . . .”).
270. No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018).
271. See id. at *1–2 (arguing that the prison placed the religious needs of
Sunni Muslims over those of Shi’ite Muslims).
272. See id. at *2 (advocating for the plaintiff’s “‘right to practice his faith as
a Shi’ite Muslim, and . . . object[ing] to the unequal treatment of Shi’ite Muslims’
compared to other faith groups” (citation omitted)).
273. See id. at *7 (contending that Griffin’s conduct did not fall within any of
the Colon factors for personal involvement).
274. See id. at *2 (discussing Griffin’s response to Allah’s grievance, which
explained that Allah was excluded from the religious services “because he did not
request participation”).
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detailed response approach, the district court ultimately adopted
the ongoing violation approach. 275
The ongoing violation approach contains two elements: (1) the
alleged constitutional violation must be ongoing at the time the
grievance is filed; and (2) the supervisor who reviews the grievance
must be in a position to remedy the ongoing violation directly. 276
The court determined that the prison’s deficient Shi’a program
constituted an ongoing constitutional violation because the basis
for Allah’s complaints existed at the time Allah filed his
grievances. 277 The court reasoned that Griffin was in a position to
remedy the ongoing violations because he held a position of
authority within the prison as the Superintendent. 278 Therefore,
the court determined that Griffin was personally involved in
failing to provide adequate religious services. 279
In contrast, the court did not find Griffin personally involved
in denying Allah access to the two religious events. 280 Whereas
Allah suffered ongoing harm as a result of the inadequate religious
system, Allah’s harm from being denied attendance at the events
ended when those events ended. 281 Therefore, there was no ongoing
constitutional violation to remedy when Allah filed his
275. See id. at *8 (choosing the ongoing violation approach because it is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and satisfies § 1983’s causation
requirements).
276. See id. at *7–8 (“The Court agrees with those cases holding that ‘an
alleged constitutional violation complained of in a grievance must be ongoing in
order to find personal involvement, such that the supervisory official who reviews
the grievance can remedy it directly.’” (citations omitted)).
277. See id. at *8 (“[T]he chaplain is a Sunni Muslim, the sermons during
Jumah service focus on Sunni Muslim [t]eachings, . . . the majority of classes
offered in DOCCS facilities are for Sunni Muslims, and the money raised through
fund[ ]raisers is used to purchase Sunni Muslim texts and other educational
material.”).
278. See id. (“[B]ased on Plaintiff’s allegations, it is plausible that Griffin, as
the supervisory official who reviewed the grievance, could have remedied [the
violations] directly.”).
279. See id. at *9 (denying Griffin’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
involvement because the unconstitutional act was ongoing and he was in a
position to remedy the violation).
280. See id. (granting Griffin’s motion to dismiss in part because his actions
did not satisfy the ongoing violation approach adopted by the district court).
281. See id. (explaining that Allah’s “harm had ceased when he filed his
grievance”).
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grievances. 282 Griffin could not go back in time to permit Allah
attendance at the services. 283 Therefore, Griffin was not personally
involved because the circumstances surrounding the violations did
not satisfy both elements of the ongoing violation test. 284
B. Qualified Immunity
It is imperative that the Second Circuit adopt a test to answer
the McKenna question because courts are avoiding the question
entirely by granting defendants qualified immunity. 285 The
doctrine of qualified immunity completely immunizes government
officials from liability when they are named as defendants in
§ 1983 suits. 286
Government officials are only liable when their conduct
violates clearly established law, otherwise they are protected by
qualified immunity. 287 When the government official is a
supervisory defendant, they are entitled to qualified immunity
“unless the actions of the supervisor and the subordinate both
violate clearly established law.” 288 The purpose of qualified

282. See id. (“[T]here was no ongoing situation that Griffin could have
remedied at the time he responded to [Allah’s] grievance.”).
283. See id. at *8 (“A superintendent cannot ‘remedy’ a violation of
constitutional rights which has already ceased by ordering some change in prison
conditions.” (citation omitted)).
284. See id. at *9 (granting Griffin’s motion to dismiss on this claim alone).
285. See Whipper v. Erfe, No. 3:18-cv-00347, 2018 WL 5618106, at *6 (D.
Conn. Oct. 30, 2018) (dismissing the supervisory defendants from the § 1983 suit
and granting qualified immunity “because the law is not clearly established”);
Corbett v. Annucci, No. 16-cv-4492, 2018 WL 919832, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2018) (granting a supervisory defendant qualified immunity, reasoning that the
intra-circuit split prevented the law from being clearly established).
286. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (granting qualified
immunity to government officials who do not violate clearly established law,
“regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact’” (citation
omitted)).
287. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015)
(explaining that qualified immunity “‘gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’” (citation omitted)).
288. Grice v. McVeigh, 873 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2017).
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immunity is to allow the government to perform its necessary
functions without frivolous interference. 289
Again, qualified immunity does not insulate a government
official from liability if they violate “clearly established law.” 290 The
law is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear “that every
‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing
violates that [law]’” and “existing precedent . . . ha[s] placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 291 This is an
extremely high standard that grants immunity to government
officials if there is any controversy surrounding the legality of their
conduct. 292
If there is a legitimate debate over whether an action would
violate a prisoner’s constitutional right, then reasonable
government officials may likewise have competing interpretations
of the law. 293 Some may act in a manner that comports with one
interpretation of the law, while others may consider such action
illegal. 294 This conflict would all but assure application of qualified
immunity.
289. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (“Qualified immunity balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”); Filarsky
v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2012) (explaining that qualified immunity “help[s]
to avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public duties, ensuring that
talented candidates are not deterred from public service, and preventing the
harmful distractions from carrying out the work of government that can often
accompany damages suits” (citation omitted)).
290. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (listing the
requirements for a defendant to be entitled to qualified immunity); supra notes
287–289 and accompanying text (same).
291. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (citation omitted); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d
334, 345 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In determining if a right is clearly established, this Court
looks to whether (1) it was defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court
or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of the right, and (3) a reasonable
defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.”).
292. See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (explaining that in order to impose liability,
the law must be clear enough that a reasonable government official would know
that certain actions would be impermissible).
293. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (explaining that
qualified immunity exists so that “officials can know that they will not be held
personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current
American law”).
294. See id. (“The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide
government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their
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Given the confusion in the Second Circuit surrounding
Iqbal, 295 Colon, 296 and McKenna 297 the law is anything but
settled. 298 As the law currently stands, it is unclear what a
supervisor must do to be personally involved in a constitutional
violation, and therefore violate the law, when denying a prison
grievance. 299 As a result, some district courts in the Second Circuit
avoid the personal involvement issue altogether and grant
supervisors qualified immunity because the supervisors are not
violating clearly established law. 300
For example, in Hayes v. Santiago, 301 prisoner Ticey Hayes
argued that District Administrator Edward Maldonado violated
his constitutional rights by denying his grievance appeal. 302 The
district court acknowledged the McKenna question 303 and the split
regarding which test to apply when answering it. 304 However, the
court neither adopted, nor applied, any of the three tests to analyze
whether Maldonado was personally involved by denying Hayes’s

conduct may give rise to liability for damage.’” (citation omitted)).
295. See supra Part III.B (discussing how Iqbal changed how circuit courts
analyze supervisory liability).
296. See supra Part III.C (discussing how Iqbal caused district courts in the
Second Circuit to split over whether Colon survived the Iqbal decision).
297. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how district courts in the Second Circuit
split in answering the McKenna question).
298. See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text (referencing the chaotic
status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit).
299. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the intra-circuit split over the McKenna
question).
300. See Whipper v. Erfe, No. 3:18-cv-00347, 2018 WL 5618106, at *6 (D.
Conn. Oct. 30, 2018) (dismissing the supervisory defendants from the § 1983 suit
and granting qualified immunity “because the law is not clearly established”);
Corbett v. Annucci, No. 16-cv-4492, 2018 WL 919832, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,
2018) (granting a supervisory defendant qualified immunity, reasoning that the
intra-circuit split prevented the law from being clearly established).
301. No. 3:18-cv-01758, 2018 WL 5456494 (D. Conn. Oct. 29, 2018).
302. See id. at *3 (describing Hayes’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Maldonado in the § 1983 suit).
303. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is
questionable whether an adjudicator’s rejection of an administrative grievance
would make him liable for the conduct complained of . . . .”).
304. See Hayes, 2018 WL 5456494, at *3 (recognizing that some district courts
apply the detailed response approach, while others apply the ongoing violation
approach).
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grievance appeal. 305 Rather, the court completely avoided the issue
by simply granting Maldonado qualified immunity. 306 The court
reasoned that Maldonado could not be held liable, regardless of any
further involvement on his part, because the law is not settled in
the Second Circuit. 307
In a similar case, prisoner King Knowledge Born Allah
brought a § 1983 suit against several prison supervisors for
denying his grievance submissions on appeal. 308 As in Hayes, the
district court acknowledged the McKenna question and explained
that “district court decisions appear divided about whether and
when a supervisory official’s denial of a grievance may constitute
sufficient [personal] involvement for a supervisory official to be
liable for a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights.” 309
Relying on this division, the court granted the supervisors
qualified immunity “because at best the law is not clearly
established that a supervisory official violates the Constitution by
erroneously denying a grievance appeal.” 310 Again, the court
dodged the underlying substantive legal question by granting
qualified immunity to the supervisory defendant. 311
C. Recommendations
In order to prevent courts from granting qualified immunity
as a way to avoid the McKenna question, the Second Circuit should
explicitly adopt the ongoing violation approach. First, the ongoing
violation approach is consistent with Supreme Court
305. See id. (avoiding the personal involvement issue by simply granting the
supervisory defendant qualified immunity without weighing in on the
intra-circuit split).
306. See id. (explaining that the “Second Circuit law is not clearly established”
regarding whether a supervisor is personally involved when they deny a
grievance).
307. See id. (dismissing Hayes’s claims against the supervisory defendant for
rejecting his grievance because he could not establish personal involvement).
308. See Allah v. Semple, No. 3:18-cv-00887, 2018 WL 3733970, at *2–3 (D.
Conn. Aug. 6, 2018) (explaining that the plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary
violation for being an active member of a prison gang, the Latin Kings).
309. Id. at *7.
310. See id. (avoiding the personal involvement issue).
311. See id. (dismissing the claims against the supervisory defendants
because the plaintiff could not establish their personal involvement).
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jurisprudence. 312 It is well-established that respondeat superior is
not a basis for liability in a § 1983 claim. 313 “Requiring an ongoing
constitutional violation which is ‘capable of mitigation at the time
the supervisory official was apprised thereof’ . . . ensures that a
[supervisor] is not held liable for every constitutional tort
committed by a subordinate solely by virtue of his role . . . in the
inmate grievance process.” 314 Therefore the ongoing violation
approach complies with the Supreme Court’s prohibition of
respondeat superior liability. 315
Second, the ongoing violation approach is consistent with
§ 1983’s causation requirements. 316 In order to impose liability on
a supervisor, a “plaintiff must also establish that the supervisor’s
actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s constitutional
deprivation.” 317 If a constitutional violation is not ongoing at the
time the supervisor reviews a grievance, and there is therefore
nothing to remedy, the supervisor cannot be said to have caused
the harm of which the plaintiff complains. 318
Third, the second Colon factor finds personal involvement
when a supervisor, “after being informed of the violation through
312. See Burton v. Lynch, 664 F. Supp. 2d 349, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that the ongoing violation approach conforms to the Supreme Court’s
prohibition against respondeat superior liability).
313. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious
liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”).
314. Allah v. Annucci, No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2018) (citation omitted).
315. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[M]ere
‘linkage in the prison chain of command’ is insufficient to implicate a state
commissioner of corrections or a prison superintendent in a § 1983 claim.”
(citation omitted)); supra notes 312–314 and accompanying text (rejecting the
notion that a supervisor could be liable for the unconstitutional acts of a
subordinate simply based on her position or employment title).
316. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of [state
law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”).
317. Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014).
318. See Annucci, 2018 WL 4571679, at *8 (explaining that a supervisor who
receives “post hoc notice” of an injury is not the proximate cause of the injury
“because the violation is not ‘ongoing and the defendant has [no] opportunity to
stop the violation after being informed of it’” (citation omitted)).
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a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.” 319 The supervisor
must be in a position to remedy a constitutional violation because
one cannot fail to remedy a wrong unless they have the power to
do so in the first place. 320
For example, a supervisor in charge of dining services in the
prison may not be in a position to remedy a prisoner’s complaint
about the quality of the prison cells. 321 If a prisoner sued the dining
service official for failing to remedy a wrong after learning of it, it
would not make sense to find the supervisor liable because they
were not in a position to remedy the wrong in the first place. The
ongoing violation approach is therefore consistent with Colon’s
language and Second Circuit precedent. 322
Finally, the ongoing violation approach solves the problems
presented by the investigation approach and the detailed response
approach, which inadvertently incentivize supervisors to
rubberstamp grievance denials. 323 Under the ongoing violation
approach, a supervisor’s personal involvement turns on two
objective factors: (1) whether the unconstitutional act was ongoing
at the time the supervisor rejected a grievance; and (2) whether
the supervisor was in a position to remedy the ongoing tort. 324 The
personal involvement analysis does not change whether or not a
319. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
320. See Ackridge v. Aramark Corr. Food Servs., No. 16-CV-6301, 2018 WL
1626175, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (finding the supervisor personally
involved in rejecting a grievance because he “could have remedied it directly”);
Young v. Choinski, 15 F. Supp. 3d 172, 192 (D. Conn. 2014) (“[I]f the supervisory
official is confronted with an ‘ongoing’ constitutional violation and reviews a
grievance or appeal regarding that violation, that official is ‘personally involved’
if he or she can remedy the violation directly.”).
321. A supervisor in this situation likely cannot do anything beyond referring
the complaint to the appropriate supervisor.
322. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 (imposing liability on supervisors who, “after
being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the
wrong” (emphasis added)).
323. See supra notes 249–252, 266–268 and accompanying text (explaining
why the investigation approach and detailed response approach may have a
chilling effect on supervisors becoming personally involved in the grievance
process).
324. See Thomas v. Calero, 824 F. Supp. 2d 488, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(explaining that the ongoing violation approach looks to whether the “alleged
constitutional violation complained of in a grievance [was] ‘ongoing’ . . . such that
the ‘supervisory official who reviews the grievance can remedy [it] directly’”
(citation omitted)).
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supervisor takes a personal interest in the grievance by ordering
an investigation or answering the prisoner’s complaint. 325 The
prison system and the courts should do everything in their power
to encourage supervisors to thoroughly investigate the
unconstitutional acts of their subordinates, and the ongoing
violation approach gives supervisors the freedom to do so without
risking increased § 1983 liability. 326
Regardless of what test the Second Circuit ultimately adopts,
it must first settle the Iqbal-Colon split before it can even address
the McKenna question. A plaintiff in a § 1983 suit must establish
that a defendant is personally involved in the unconstitutional act
by demonstrating that their conduct fell within one of the Colon
factors. 327 When a supervisor denies a prisoner’s grievance without
any other involvement, their actions could only possibly fall under
the second or fifth Colon factors:
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be
shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly
in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after
being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed
to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or
custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or
allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the
defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates
who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited
deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act
on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring. 328

325. See Allah v. Annucci, No. 16-CV-1841, 2018 WL 4571679, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2018) (granting the supervisory defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal involvement because the alleged unconstitutional harm had stopped
by the time the supervisor reviewed the grievance).
326. See supra notes 323–325 and accompanying text (arguing that the
ongoing violation approach does not have a chilling effect on supervisors becoming
invested in a prisoner’s grievance by investigating the alleged misconduct).
327. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled
in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (citation
omitted)).
328. Colon, 58 F.3d at 873; see also Funches v. Russo, No. 9:17-CV-1292, 2018
WL 6381058, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2018) (explaining that the second Colon
factor applies where a supervisory defendant denies or rejects a plaintiff’s
grievance).
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If only the first and third Colon factors survive Iqbal, then the
supervisor would not be sufficiently personally involved in the
unconstitutional act by rejecting the prisoner’s grievance
submission. 329 Without personal involvement, the supervisor
would not be liable. 330 However, if all five Colon factors survive
Iqbal, 331 then the official may be personally involved in the
unconstitutional act by rejecting the prisoner’s grievance
submission. 332 Simply put, if Iqbal supersedes Colon, then the
McKenna question becomes moot. 333
The Second Circuit must resolve both of these intra-circuit
splits because they are necessarily intertwined as the resolution of
one directly affects the outcome of the other. 334 Unless, and until,
the Second Circuit holds that Iqbal invalidates all but the first and
third Colon factors, the McKenna question remains unanswered.
V. Conclusion
The status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit is
chaotic considering the compounding effect of the Colon split and
the unresolved McKenna question. 335 This confusion permits
329. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing how the restrictive courts hold that
Iqbal eliminates the second and fifth Colon factors as a basis for personal
involvement).
330. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 501 (“It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite
to an award of damages under § 1983.’” (citation omitted)).
331. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing how the hybrid courts continue to
apply the second and fifth Colon factors as long as the elements of the underlying
constitutional tort permit their application).
332. I emphasize the word “may” because it is unclear whether the supervisor
would in fact be liable in light of the McKenna split. See supra Part IV.A
(discussing how some district courts find personal involvement when a supervisor
rejects a grievance alone, whereas other courts require a higher degree of
involvement).
333. See supra notes 327–332 and accompanying text (demonstrating why the
McKenna question cannot be definitively answered until the Second Circuit
resolves the Iqbal issue).
334. See supra notes 327–333 (explaining that the Second Circuit cannot
answer the McKenna question before resolving the Colon split).
335. See supra Parts III–IV (discussing the two intra-circuit splits and laying
the groundwork for courts to grant supervisory defendants qualified immunity to
avoid the splits).
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courts to grant supervisors qualified immunity—a trend that adds
further complication to an area of law already fraught with
uncertainty. 336
Qualified immunity offers district courts a cop-out. 337 Rather
than analyzing the personal involvement question and weighing
the merits of the various personal involvement tests, district courts
can avoid the issue altogether by declaring the law too unsettled to
warrant supervisory liability. 338 This uncertainty will continue
unless the Second Circuit clarifies Iqbal’s effect on Colon and
issues a definitive answer to the question it posed in McKenna. 339
Until this happens, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for
prisoners to recover against supervisors regardless of how involved
they are in the grievance process.
Unfortunately, this trend is not surprising given that § 1983
no longer provides the protection that it once did. 340 In fact, “[t]here
is a growing consensus among practitioners, scholars, and judges
that Section 1983 is no longer serving its original and intended
function as a vehicle for remedying violations of constitutional
rights, that it is broken in many ways, and that it is sorely in need
of repairs.” 341 Since Monroe v. Pape first made § 1983 a viable
cause of action, the courts have “substantially diminished the
availability of § 1983 damages actions.” 342 The absolute hectic
336. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62
FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 (2010) (“In fact, determining whether an officer violated
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and
confusion.”).
337. See id. at 869 (explaining that “the law of qualified immunity is out of
balance” and “[t]he Supreme Court needs to intervene . . . to get constitutional
tort law back on track”).
338. See supra Parts III.D.2, IV.B (discussing how district courts avoid
answering the intra-circuit splits by relying on qualified immunity).
339. See supra Parts III.D.2, IV.C (encouraging the Second Circuit to
definitively rule on these splits to prevent courts from simply granting qualified
immunity to supervisors without weighing the merits of the case).
340. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 4 (explaining that the Supreme Court
“has been hostile to [§ 1983], continuously narrowing it and imposing restrictions
on civil rights plaintiffs”).
341. Blum, supra note 24, at 913–14; see also Adelman, supra note 26, at 9
(explaining that federal courts of appeals dismiss about seventy-two percent of
§ 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds).
342. See Chen, supra note 250, at 890, 910 (“In the nearly fifty years that have
passed since Monroe, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have
gradually diminished § 1983 in ways that make damages recovery both costly and
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status of supervisory liability in the Second Circuit contributes to
this diminution and demonstrates how § 1983 is practically
ineffectual in the courts. 343
While a comprehensive critique of § 1983 is beyond the scope
of this Note, it is clear that § 1983 cannot “function in [its] current,
weakened state.” 344 The Second Circuit, however, can take a step
towards strengthening the statute’s viability by resolving the two
intra-circuit splits. 345 First, the court must definitively rule on
Iqbal’s impact on the Colon factors. The court should adopt the
hybrid approach and hold that the Colon factors survive as long as
the underlying constitutional tort does not require a showing of
discriminatory intent.
Second, the court must definitively answer the McKenna
question. The Second Circuit should adopt the ongoing violation
approach and hold that a supervisor is personally involved by
rejecting a grievance where the unconstitutional act is ongoing and
they are in a position to remedy the misconduct. Resolving the
splits in this manner will prevent courts from excessively granting
qualified immunity and will provide prisoners a functional means
to enforce their constitutional rights.

difficult.”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining that qualified
immunity is not simply a defense raised at trial, but a complete immunity from
suit and the court must resolve the issue before trial to protect the official from
the burdens of discovery and litigation).
343. See Adelman, supra note 26, at 9 (lamenting that “[t]he clear message
sent by the Supreme Court is that district courts should think twice before
allowing suits against government officials for violation a person’s constitutional
rights to proceed”).
344. Chen, supra note 250, at 928.
345. See id. at 928–29 (“If the Court, Congress, and the academic community
fail to recognize the valuable role that § 1983 damages claims play . . . then for
many litigants, like their video game counterparts, it is ‘game over.’”).

